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DEPRECIATION IN'RATE MAKING
D EPRECIATION is "an invisible, intangible thing" exist-ing, principally, in the contemplation of engineers, ac-
countants and that great body of people who have to do with
the fixation of public utility rates.
Unlike the law of corporations which has been evolved
mainly through legislative enactment, the law of deprecia-
tion is a matter principally for judicial declaration as part
of the judicial review of rate cases. The declarations which
do exist are characterized by inconsistencies and, until re-
cently, a lack of any degree of definiteness. It seems that the
fundamental judicial concepts, for the larger part, are yet
to be fixed.
Depreciation in its broad sense may be defined as the
inevitable lessening in value of all property, except land, due
to physical deterioration, inadequacy and obsolescence.' In
a more restricted sense depreciation is the lessening in value
due to physical deterioration alone. The effect of deprecia-
tion is the exhaustion from whatever cause of the service life
of the property used by the utility in the rendition of its
service, and, when that is complete, the result is the removal
or abandonment of the property.
I
The cost of a kilowatt of electric current represents not
only part of the cost of a ton of coal but also a part of the
cost of the building in which the coal may be stored pending
use. The difference as an element of cost is merely one of
time-the productivity of the building extends over a long
period of time while the productivity of the ton of coal is
"By the expense of depreciation is meant:
(a) The losses suffered through the current lessening in value of
tangible property from wear and tear (not covered by current repairs),
(b) Obsolescence or inadequacy resulting from age, physical change
or supersession by reason of new inventions and discoveries, changes in
popular demand, or public requirements and,
(c) Losses suffered through destruction of property by extraordi-
nary casualties."
Uniform System of Accounts For Telephone Companies As Prescribed By
The Interstate Commerce Commission Effective January 1, 1913 at p. 67.
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confined to a short period. Unless the charges for service are
sufficient to effect a reimbursement to the utility for the cost
of the building as well as the cost of the coal the capital of
the investors in the utility will accordingly be impaired. The
assurance of a return of capital is equally important as the
assurance of a return on capital.
Managers of public utilities early realized that the loss
which would be suffered, when the cumulative effect of de-
preciation necessitated retirement or abandonment, must be
anticipated and provided for before the termination of the
service life of the property. In the case of the Bell Telephone
Companies the first plan adopted was to segregate a portion
of the annual profits.2 But since depreciation is a cost of
rendering service it is properly an item of expense to be al-
lowed for before determining profits and in 1909 the Supreme
Court so held:
"Before coming to the question of profit at all the
company is entitled to earn a sufficient sum annually
to provide not only for current repairs, but for making
good the depreciation and replacing the parts of the
property when they come to the end of their life." 3
Prior to 1909 the Court had held that "only such expen-
ditures as are actually made" can be claimed with propriety
as a deduction from revenues in determining net earnings.4
2 Extract from circular sent out by the American Bell Telephone Company
to its various local licensee companies throughout the country in 1884.
"* * * It is certain that the present expense for Repairs and
Reconstruction is not proportionate to the actual deterioration of prop-
erty and that in future years the revenue of most companies will be
subjected to much heavier charges on this account. It is suggested that
a reserve fund be set apart, to which shall be carried such part of the
annual profits as represents the estimated amount of yearly depreciation
not covered by the expenditure on account of Repairs and Reconstruction."
Reprinted from paper submitted to International Congress on Accounting,
September 9-14, 1929, by A. B. Crunden and D. R. Belcher of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company.
'Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 212 U. S. at 13. 29 Sup. Ct.
Rep. at 152 (1909). See also Louisiana R. R. Com. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel.
Co., 212 U. S. 414, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357 (1909) where it was said, "That it
was the right to raise more money to pay for depreciation than was actually
disbursed for the particular year there can be no doubt, for a reserve is neces-
sary in any business of this kind."
'United States v. Kansas Pacific R. Co., 99 U. S. 455, 459 (1878). See
also Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Company, 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1047 (1894).
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In 1912 the Interstate Commerce Commission promul-
gated the Uniform System of Accounts for Telephone Com-
panies in which it provided "that the companies should in-
clude in operating expenses, depreciation charges for the pur-
pose of creating proper and adequate reserves to cover the
expenses of depreciation, currently accruing in the tangible
fixed capital." r, It was also provided that the total deprecia-
tion should be distributed as nearly as may be throughout
the life of the depreciating property.6 Similar provision was
made in the Uniform System of Accounts prescribed for
Telegraph and Cable Companies which was made effective as
of January 1, 19 14 . 7
It is evident that the cost of long-lived property is not
properly an expense wholly of the year in which the construc-
tion expenditures are incurred-nor is it properly an expen-
diture wholly of the year in which the property is removed or
abandoned and the loss due to depreciation realized. It apo
plies to all the years which measure the useful life of the
property. The patrons of the utility receive the same benefits
throughout its entire life and it is but equitable that the
patrons in each year should bear an equal burden. That the
actual lessening in value may be less rapid in 'the earlier
years of the life of the property than in the latter years is
irrelevant, for depreciation as an expense of any one year
does not aim to measure the lessening in value of the prop-
erty during that year but is simply an equitable portion of
the total cost of the property subjected to depreciation.8
These principles lead to the adoption of what is termed
the "straight-line method of depreciation." The expenses of
each year are charged with an amount determined by divid-
ing the cost of the plant by the number of years measuring
5 Uniform System of Accounts for Telephone Companies at p. 67.
'Idem.
"At p. 16. See also Uniform System of Accounts for Express Companies
effective July 1, 1914 at p. 13.
"A contention in which there is not a little merit is that as the property
grows older, maintenance costs increase, and consequently there should be a
proportionate decrease in the amount of depreciation charged to the expenses
of the later years. This is the argument of the proponents of the plan of
computing depreciation on a reducing balance (original cost less depreciation
already written off). However, in the case of a utility, the plant of which is
constantly turning over, with both new and old plant in service, the repair
costs tend to equalize.
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its service life. As the expenses of each year are charged the
accounting practice is to credit an equal amount to an ac-
count termed the "Reserve for Depreciation." At the expira-
tion of the service life of the property, if the estimate of the
life has been correct, the cumulative amount will equal the
cost of the property. When the property is retired the cost
is deducted from the appropriate asset account to which it
was charged when the plant was acquired, and concurrently
deducted from the amount in the Reserve. Consequently at
any point of time the asset accounts represent only the prop-
erty remaining in service while the depreciation reserve rep-
resents the amount of the original cost which has been allo-
cated to past operations. Since this is based purely on a
method of spreading the cost of the property evenly over the
years of its life it should be evident that at any one time dur-
ing the life of the property the balance in the Reserve is no
measure of the actual depreciation existent in the property.
This proposition will be more fully discussed in the following
pages.9
There has been no occasion for the sanctioning by the
Supreme Court of the straight-line method in contradistinc-
tion to various other accounting methods practiced in the
allocation of depreciation to the various years.' 0 The pro-
priety of the amount carried annually to the reserve is princi-
pally a question of fact to be determined by the various regu-
latory commissions rather than a question of law. It may
become a question of law, however, if it appears that the
amount is unreasonable."
Manifestly, it is unreasonable to charge the cost of prop-
erty to the expenses of the year when built and then claim an
allowance for depreciation in the expenses of the ensuing
years. If the property has been built and its cost recorded as
an asset, for the depreciation of which an annual allowance
'Infra p. 225.
10 Other methods are: reducing balance; compound interest or equal annual
payment; unit of production; working hour. See R. B. Kester, Accounting
Theory and Practice (1918), Vol. 2, pp. 150-186; V. B. Canning, The Econom-
ics of Accountancy (1929), 265-309.
2 "Where rates found by a regulatory body to be compensatory are attacked
as being confiscatory, the courts may inquire into the method by which its con-
clusion is reached." Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Commission, 274 U. S.
344, 351, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604, 606 (1926).
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may be claimed, it would manifestly be equally unreasonable
to permit the cost of replacing major parts of the property to
be charged to expense. If there is a continual replacing of
parts the cost of which is treated as an expense it is evident
that complete rehabilitation of the property may be effected
and the cost thereof charged to expenses. In such a case to
allow depreciation on the original cost of the property would
effectuate a duplication of expense and a double burdening
of the patrons of the utility. As the Court points out:
"If in the past, reconstruction and replacement
charges have been met out of current expenses, the
fact must be taken into consideration, both when we
come to estimating future net income and in deter-
mining what sum shall be annually set aside to guard
against future depreciation. * * * Otherwise there will
be a double deduction on that account, first by paying
such charges as they occur and thereafter by a con-
tribution out of the remaining income for the same
object." 12
Similarly the practice of the utility with regard to the main-
tenance and repair of the plant should be considered. The
higher the standard of maintenance, the longer will be the
service life of the property insofar as the effect of wear and
tear is involved. As the annual amount of depreciation ex-
pense is determined by dividing the cost by the number of
years it will be in service, the amount of the annual charge
should accordingly be decreased. Inherently these are ques-
tions of fact to be considered in the initial process of rate
making, but if from the record the unreasonableness is appar-
ent they are properly subjects for judicial comment and
decision.13
Until lately accounting theory and practice has pro-
ceeded on the hypothesis that the purpose of depreciation is
to preserve the original investment. The post-war rise in
price levels has raised the question whether the amount of
"Lincoln Gas and Elec. Co. v. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
271 (1912).
s Supra Note 11.
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depreciation should be based on an amount necessary to re-
place the property as distinguished from an amount sufficient
to effect a reimbursement of the cost of the original property.
This question was recently presented 11 to the Supreme Court
and it was held that the allowance for depreciation should be
based not on cost but on present values.', Three members of
the Court dissented from the view of the majority, Mr. Justice
Brandeis writing an admirable opinion. For the majority
Mr. Justice Sutherland writes:
"One of the items of expense to be ascertained and
deducted is the amount necessary to restore property
worn out or impaired, so as continuously to maintain
it as nearly as practicable at the same level of effi-
ciency for the public service. The amount set aside
periodically for this purpose is the so-called deprecia-
tion allowance. Manifestly, this allowance can not be
limited by the original cost, because if values have
advanced, the allowance is not sufficient to maintain
the level of efficiency. The utility 'is entitled to see
that from earnings the value of the property invested
is kept unimpaired, so that at the end of any given
term of years the original investment remains as it
was at the beginning' Knoxville v. Water Co. This
naturally calls for expenditures equal to the cost of
the worn-out equipment at the time of replacement;
and this, for all practical purposes, means present
value. It is the settled rule of this Court that the rate
base is present value and it would be wholly illogical
to adopt a different rule for depreciation." 16
The result of the decision is to adopt, as a matter of law,
the view that the purpose of depreciation is to provide for
"' Prior to the recent case, the matter was before the Supreme Court. In
the United Fuel Gas Co. v. Commission, 278 U. S. 300, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150(1928) it was contended that depreciation should be based on present values.
The Court did not determine the validity of the contention but decided the case
on other grounds-that "conceding the contention of the appellant, there was a
failure to show that the rate imposed is confiscatory or otherwise such as to
call for the interference of a court of equity."
' United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore v. West et a[., 280
U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123 (January 1930).
"'Ibid. 280 U. S. at 253, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 126.
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replacements as distinguished from the preservation of the
original investment. In other words, the amount of the de-
preciation expense is to be measured by a sum sufficient to
replace property identical with that in service at prices deter-
mined by present value rather than to provide a sum suffi-
cient to reimburse the utility with an amount equal to the
original dollars invested.
No judicial precedents expressly holding this point are
cited by the Court in support of its result. One of the few
cases 17 which is cited in the opinion is the Knoxville Water
Company case, from which a quotation is inserted. The fol-
lowing words contained in the Knoxville decision are but a
few sentences removed from the portion of that opinion
ivhich the Justice quotes:
"The Company is entitled to earn a sufficient
sum annually to provide not only for current repairs,
but for making good the depreciation and replacing
the parts of the property when they come to the end
of their life." 18
While these omitted words are supporting authority for
the position of the majority, the language actually quoted by
Mr. Justice Sutherland from the Knoxville case would seem
to indicate an inconsistent and even contrary position:
(The utility) "is entitled to see that from earn-
ings the value of the property invested is kept un-
impaired so that at the end of any given term of years
the original investment remains as it was at the
beginning." 19
"The Court also cites Utilities Commission v. Telephone Company, 228
Mich. 658 (1924), quoting the Michigan Supreme Court from p. 666:
"If the, rate base is present fair value, then the depreciation base as
to depreciable property is the same thing. There is no principle to
sustain a holding that a utility may earn on the present value of its
property devoted to public service, but that it must accept and the public
must pay depreciation on book cost or investment cost regardless of
present fair value. * * *'"
kference is also made to former decisions of the Court in Southwestern
Telephone Co. v. Commission, 262 U.,S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544 (1922) and
Georgia Ry. v. Commission, 262 U. S. 625, 43,Sup. Ct. Rep. 680 (1922).
Neither of these decisions contributes anything of substance to the discussion.
"212 U. S. at 13-14, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 152.
" Supra Note 16, 280 U. S. at 25,4, 50. Sup. Ct. Rep. at 126.
DEPRECIATION IN RATE MAKING
The second exposition of the grounds of the opinion
which arrests attention is the allegation that the purpose of
the "so-called depreciation allowance" is to "restore property
worn out or impaired." Examination of the writings of ac-
counting authorities, as pointed out in the exhaustive review
contained in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
and familiarity with actual practices in no way substantiates
this view.
Thirdly, the majority opinion asserts that it would be
illogical to adopt a rule for depreciation different from the
rule for a rate base which is measured by present values. It
is difficult to appreciate why it would be illogical. Depre-
ciation is a means of returning capital, while a rate base is a
means of computing a return on capital.
Neither does it seem that the "replacement theory" can
be preferred on the merits. If a utility were a temporary
institution, operating while its original property or plant ex-
isted and liquidating upon its retirement, it is difficult to
assume that even the majority would seriously advance the
"replacement theory." The factual situation, however, is that
a utility is a semi-permanent institution continually replac-
ing its plant.
At the present time, when the original plant constructed
at pre-war prices is abandoned or retired, the property re-
placing it, due to the post-war rise in prices, costs consider-
ably more. If depreciation has been based upon cost, ob-
viously the amount of the reimbursement to the utility has
been less than the amount needed for replacement purposes.
The additional funds will have to be provided principally by
the issuance of additional capital obligations in the form of
stocks or bonds. If the depreciation had been based upon
replacement values, assuming that the cost of replacement
has been accurately forecasted, the amount of the reimburse-
ment would be sufficient for replacing the property. Patrons
of the utility during the past would have been providing
funds through payment of higher rates based on higher de-
preciation charges, to build new plant. The result, therefore,
under the "replacement theory" is that the patrons of the fu-
ture are profiting by not having to provide for interest and
dividends on additional capital obligations-but the profit is
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at the expense of the patrons of the past. There seems to be
no economic justification for burdening one generation for
the benefit of another.
Looking to the future-suppose the price levels of the
future are estimated to decline from the present level. Com-
puting depreciation on the estimated replacement costs of
the future, the depreciation charges to current patrons will
be less than the cost of the present plant. When the time
comes for replacement, funds sufficient to rebuild the plant
will have been made available. But the investment of the
stockholders and bondholders of the present will have become
impaired through failure to secure reimbursement for the
cost of the property originally built at higher prices. It is
difficult to assume that the Court would adhere to the
"replacement theory" when impairment of capital is likely
to occur. Uniformity of treatment and stability of business
methods is always desirable where possible.
Furthermore, the adoption of present values as a meas-
ure of ultimate replacement costs adds to the frailties of the
"replacement theory" and is fraught with uncertainty. To
quote Mr. Justice Brandeis' astute dissenting opinion:
"Each year the present value may be different.
* ** To use as a measure of the year's consumption of
plant a depreciation charge based on fluctuating pres-
ent values substitutes conjecture for experience. Such
a system would require the consumer of today to pay
for an assumed operating expense which has never
been incurred and which may never arise." 20
The doctrine enunciated by the Court is supported by
no controlling authority, is directly contrary to recognized
practice and appears unsound in principle. Nor is it required
by the "fair value" rule of Smyth v. Ames, itself a much-
criticized doctrine. Most of the difficulty seems to lie in the
use of loose language which has often characterized discus-
sion of depreciation. The Depreciation Reserve is often
spoken of as a Replacement Reserve even by those who do not
adhere to the "replacement theory." Depreciation may be an
"Ibid. 280 U. S. at 278, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 135.
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instrumentality in providing for replacing property, but, as
its name implies, its purpose is to secure reimbursement for
the cost of original property and thus preserve the integrity
of the original investment.
II
The primary problem in the rate fixing proces&, as pres.
ently conceived, is the determination of the "fair value of the
property being used by the utility for the convenience of the
public." 21 The term "fair value of the property" would seem
to imply that its value new had been diminished so as to allow
at least for the effect of usage and deterioration. Obviously
old and deteriorated plant and equipment are not worth as
much for any purpose, as corresponding new facilities. In
1909 the Supreme Court explicitly declared that valuation is
incomplete without allowance for depreciation:
"It would seem to be inevitable that in many
parts of the plant there should be such depreciation,
as for example in old structures and equipment re-
maining on hand. And when an estimate of value is
made on the basis of reproduction new, the extent of
existing depreciation should be shown and deducted
* * * and when particular physical items are estimated
as worth so much new, if in fact they be depreciated,
this amount should be found and allowed for. If this
is not shown the physical valuation is manifestly
incomplete." 22
The methods of determining the amount of existent de-
preciation are as varied as the experts of the parties to the
proceeding.23 The usual process is one of appraisal and al-
S"The basis of all calculations as to reasonableness of rates to be charged
by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the
fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public."
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466 (1898).
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. at 457, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 763 (1912).
See also Pacific Gas, etc. Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep.
537 (1924).
'Examples are (1) "Inspection," by which the actual depreciation or
physical deterioration manifest to the eye is determined; (2) "Straight Line or
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lowance-another of the arduous and expensive tasks made
necessary by the holding in Smyth v. Ames. "There must be
a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper considera-
tion of all relevant factors." 24 The claim must be supported
by reliable evidence.25 Valuation of the condition of the
property by actual appraisal is preferable according to the
Court:
"The testimony of competent valuation engineers
who examined the property and made estimates in re-
spect of its condition is to be preferred to mere calcula-
tions based on averages and assumed probabilities." 26
At best, however, "averages and assumed probabilities"
play an important part in the work of a valuation engineer
and the amount of actual depreciation can not be determined
with mathematical precision.
The greater part of deterioration or depreciation of prop-
erty actually occurs in the latter years of its life. "Depre-
ciation comes on very slowly at first so far as percentage is
concerned, but rapidly toward the end of the life of the prop-
erty." 27 On the other hand, the expense of depreciation is
distributed on the books of the company evenly over the en-
tire life of the property. Consequently the amount accrued
in the depreciation reserve is greater than the amount of
actual depreciation existing in the property at any given
time. The bookkeeping procedure differs in this respect from
the fact.
Nevertheless it has been contended by various regula-
tory bodies that the balance in the depreciation reserve
Age Life," by which the life of the various elements of the property is assumed
and the age is either assumed or ascertained; (3) "Rehabilitation," by which is
estimated the amount of money required to restore the property to condition
new; (4) "Sinking Fund," by which a mathematical calculation is made to
determine the per cent. condition and the depreciation.
' Supra Note 22, Minnesota Rate Cases.
' Ohio Utilities Company Case, 267 U. S. 359, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259 (1925);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. 185 (1913).
" McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. at 416, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep.
at 150 (1926).
'
7 Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Commission, 5 F. (2nd) 77, 95 (E. D. So. Car.
1925).
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should be taken as the measure of the amount of depreciation
in determining the fair value of the property. Such a treat-
ment is an error of law.
"To deduct from the fair value of the plaintiff's
property the entire book reserve for depreciation, in
order to reach a rate base, was error of law. In point
of fact the property was not depreciated that much;
the commission did not find any such depreciation." 28
It has recently been pointed out, however, that the rec-
ord in the particular case "shows that there is more reason
to believe that the actual existing depreciation in the plain-
tiff's property is reflected by the amount of its reserve for
depreciation than that it is shown by the estimate of experts
who stated observed (actual) depreciation." 29
Another problem in determining a proper rate base also
involves the depreciation reserve. The proposition as stated
by the Indiana Legislature is as follows:
"In no event shall moneys temporarily expended
from this fund (depreciation reserve) for new con-
struction, extensions, or additions to the property be
carried into or considered a part of the capital ac-
count (rate base) of such public utility." 30
It is a misstatement of the fact to speak of "property
built with money out of the depreciation reserve" for the
depreciation reserve does not represent a reservation of
funds. To repeat, it is a mere bookkeeping device. The most
that can be said for the fact is that "every charge to operat-
ing expenses (reflected concurrently as a credit to the re-
' New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast, 300 Fed. 822, 825 (1924), cited
with apparent approval in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra Note 26,
272 U. S. at 416, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 150. See also Pacific Gas Co. v. San
Francisco, supra Note 22, Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pacific, 268 U. S. 146,
159 (1924); Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations, 269 Fed. 433, 445
D. C. Kansas 1920).
' New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast et aL., 36 Fed. (2nd), 54 at 66
(S. D. N. Y. 1929).
nActs of 1925, p. 210. Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. (1926), Vol. 3, Secs.
12693-12696, p. 1245.
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serve) results in the retention in the business of a corre-
sponding amount of current revenue which would otherwise
be shown as profits." 31 A growing and expanding public
utility is a monstrous consumer of funds and the practice is
to use the funds made available in this manner in the con-
struction of new plant required by expansion and growth.
Obviously, it is sound business policy to invest funds in prop-
erty yielding seven or eight per cent.8 2 rather than in securi-
ties yielding four or five per cent. However, it is contended
that the value of the property financed through the deprecia-
tion charge should be excluded from the value of the prop-
erty on which the utility is entitled to earn.
To quote the Supreme Court in one of the earlier cases:
"It certainly was not proper for the complainant
(the utility) to take the money, or any portion of it,
which it received as a result of the rates under which
it was operating and so to use it or any part of it as
to permit the paying of dividends to stockholders. If
this were allowable, it would be collecting money to
pay for depreciation of the property and having col-
lected it to use it in another way upon which the com-
plainant would obtain a return and distribute it to
the stockholders." 33
While this expression of the Court's opinion is not
perfectly clear there is strong ground for Commissioner
Eastman's view that "in the Louisiana case the Court ap-
parently takes the ground that extensions or improvements
constructed-from the proceeds of reserves set aside for de-
preciation are not to be included in the fair value." 34
'Effective Regulation of Public Utilities, John Bauer (1925), at p. 147.
' In McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company, supra Note 26, the Supreme
Court held "a reasonable rate of return is not less tan seven per cent." and
cited among others the following recent decisions as supporting a higher rate
of return: Lincoln Gas. Co. v. Lincoln, supra Note 12; Galveston Electric Co.
v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 351 (1922) ; Bluefield Water Co.
v. Commission, 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675 (1923).
'Louisiana Commission v. Cumberland Tel. and Tel. Co., 212 U. S. 414, 29
Sup. Ct. Rep. 357 (1909).
'In re Stock of Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. R., 67 I. C. C. 156,
177 (1921).
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This line of argument proceeds on the ground that the
money collected by the utility on account of depreciation in
some vague manner still remains the property of the custom-
ers of the utility. The answer to this specious argument is
set forth in a comparatively recent decision of the Court
which apparently overrules the earlier decision:
"Customers pay for service, not for the property
used to render it. Their payments are not contribu-
tions to depreciation or other operating expenses or
to capital of the company. By paying bills for service
they do not acquire any interest, legal or equitable, in
the property used for their convenience or in the funds
of the company. Property paid for out of moneys re-
ceived for service belongs to the company just as
does that purchased out of proceeds of its bonds and
stocks." 31
The matter might seem, as juristic writers like to put it,
well settled, :were it not for an observation by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the recent Baltimore
case:
"It may also be that so much of the depreciation
reserve as has not been used for retirements or replace-
ments (balance in the reserve) should be subtracted
from the present value of the utility's property in
determining the rate base, on the theory that the
amounts thus contributed by the public represent a
part payment for the property consumed or to be con-
sumed in the service." 36
While the statement is not at all assertive it does indi-
cate the existence of a substantial doubt in the judicial mind,
a doubt which seems to traverse the holding in the telephone
case cited above. It is unlikely, however, that the Court will
5 Commissioners v. New York Telephone Co., 271 U. S. 23, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep.
363 (1926). See also Monroe Gaslight and Fuel Co. v. Commission, 292 Fed.
139 (Mich. 1923).
2 Supra Note 15, 280 U. S. at 286, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 137 (Footnote 57
of the opinion).
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retract its former holding, which is sound in logic and result
but a qualification of the application of its precepts may be
imminent.
Since the amount of actual depreciation existing in the
property is deducted from the rate base, it is a duplication to
this extent also to deduct the balance in the reserve. The rate
base is decreased by the amount of the actual depreciation
and consequently the utility ought to be entitled to a return,
at least, on a like amount of funds secured through the de-
preciation charge and invested in new property. 7 In cases
where the balance in the reserve representing funds collected
from the patrons and invested in new property exceeds the
amount of the actual depreciation deducted from the rate
base, it is fair to concede to the patrons some credit for
having reimbursed the utility in advance of the loss in value
in the rate base due to the deduction of actual depreciation.
It would seem to follow that an amount equal to the excess
of the reserve balance over the actual depreciation should be
excluded from the base on which a return is computed. This
treatment does not militate against the principle that "Prop-
erty paid for out of moneys received for service belongs to
the Company." It simply recognizes the fact that the patrons
are making payments for depreciation not yet occurred.
However, the ownership of the moneys passes to the utility
with its transfer and the right to use it rests with the dis-
cretion of the utility. Investing it in property involves a
certain amount of business risks not attendant upon invest-
ment in government securities for example. Hence the utility
should be entitled to some compensation for the incurred
risk-the difference between the yield on securities and the
yield in the business. The remainder should be allowed as a
credit to net earnings in favor of the patrons. Possibly an
adjustment of the equities along this line of reasoning is
what is contemplated by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
The problem of depreciation is but a part of the burden-
some task of determining fair rates which may be charged by
public utilities. It does seem that the courts are prone to
"If accrued depreciation were deducted from cost of plant in determining
fair value, then, on the contrary, extensions financed out of depreciation reserves
ought to be included." "Salier on Depreciation, 418." Utilities Commission v.
Telephone Company, supra Note 17 at 667.
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trespass upon the province of the regulatory bodies in so far
as questions of fact are involved. Perhaps this is necessary
in order to curb the overzealous administrative mind guided
to some degree by a yearning for political popularity, but the
recent Baltimore case would seem to indicate that more re-
gard for the findings of the administrative bodies, as well as
the practices of business men, might profitably be employed.
Rate case litigation has reached the point where, because
of its complexity both in point of law and fact, expenditures
of hundreds of thousands of dollars and years of time are
common in each case.38 This has become a severe economic
burden to the public. Whether it be the adoption of the pru-
dent investment theory 39 or some other, simplification of the
process would be extremely beneficial in order that at least
the out-of-pocket expenses might be reduced as well as other
more obvious benefits achieved. At the present time the
American pardonable pride in efficiency, is, in this field,
hardly substantiated.
EDWIN P. WOLFE.
St. John's College School of Law.
'As a recent article on the Federal Court decision in the Telephone Com-
pany case points out, "The magnitude of the case can be indicated by the
following: The first hearing before the master took place on October 14, 1924;
the last hearing on September 10, 1928. There appeared about 625 witnesses;
pages of testimony numbered close to 37,000; and over 3,000 exhibits were
introduced." "The New York Telephone Rate Decision" by Nathaniel Gold,
National Municipal Review, March, 1930, at p. 181. These statistics but par-
tially present the picture. The proceedings before the State Commission were
commenced two years prior to 1924. At the present time hearings are being
held before the Commission with respect to a proposed modification of the order
of the Court, and an appeal to the Supreme Court also seems likely, a decade
of litigation with its consequent expense being borne by the public.
' Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Commission, supra Note 17, dissent-
ing opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Goddard, Fair Value of Public Utilities,
22 Mich. Law Review 777.
